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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
BERNICE ULIBARRI, 
Plaitntiff and Appellamt, 
vs. 
JOSEPH CHRISTENSON and SALT 
LAKE CAB OWNER'S OPERAT-
ING CO., INC., doing business a.s 
UTE CAB C·O., 
Defendants and Respond-ents. 
BRIEF· OF RI~SPONDENTS 
STATEMENrr OF F·ACTS 
Case No. 
8191 
This appeal arose out of an order granting a motion 
for Summary Judgment in favor of defendants below. 
For this reason there are hut few facts appearing from 
the record relating to the origin of the cause of action. 
It would, therefore, seem desirable to relate briefly some 
of the underlying events which are the background of 
the present ap·peal. 
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On August 18, 1953, at about 12 :10 a.m. a west-bound 
1948 Chevrolet sedan driven by Juan Santiago Mateo 
collided head-on with an east-bound 1947 Buick sedanette 
driven by Wilford Joseph Coca on Utah Highway 48 
about one and one-half miles east of Copperton, Utah. 
Both drivers were rendered unconscious and the force of 
the collision demolished both cars. Ap·proximately 10 
minutes later and before investigators reached the scene 
and while the darkened wrecked cars still remained on 
the highway, respondent's 1953 Chevrolet taxicab, pro-
ceeding east, driven by John W. Christenson, rounded 
a curve and, although the driver swerved as soon as his 
lights revealed the wrecked cars, he was una:ble to avoid 
a collision and glanced off the side of the stopp·e'd Buick 
in which Mr. Coca was sitting, unconscious and seriously 
injured as a re'Sult of the first collision. Mr. Coca died 
three hours later in the hospital. 
On August 22, 1953, ap·pellant, her son, her daughter, 
and her husband executed a "Release of all Claims" (Ex. 
1). On August 24, 1953, the check of respondent, Salt 
Lake Cab Owner':s Operating Co., Inc., in the amount of 
$300.00, as agreed upon in the release, was delivered to 
ap·pella~t (R. 5). The check was later returned to 
respondents. 
Ap~p.ellant brought suit on January 9, 1954, for the 
alleged wrongful death of Mr. Coca. On February 26, 
1954, respondents filed their Motion for Summary J udg-
ment upon the ground that the cause of action alleged 
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had been fully released and settled. This Motion was 
argued on March 18, 1954, before the Law and Motion 
Division of the District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr., presiding, and granted; and 
on March 23, 1954, judgment was entered. Thi'S appeal 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING RESPOND-
ENT'S MOTIO:N FO·R SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING RESPOND-
ENT'S MOTIO:N FO·R SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Appellant contends that the court erred in not find-
ing as a matter of law that the_ R·elease was "null and 
ineffective." The grounds of this contention are: 
1. The Release is ambiguous and uncertain in that 
it refers to "permanent and progressive" injuries where-
as in actuality Mr. Coca was dead at the time the release 
was executed. 
2. There was a failure of consideration since $300.00 
i.tn cash was not paid to plaintiff. 
The con1plete answer to the first contention is found 
1n an examination of the Release itself, attached as 
appendix (Exhibit 1). It is in clear and precise terms 
just what it purport~s to be-a "Release .of all Claims." 
How it could be 1nade ambiguous by reference to "perma-
nent and progressive" injuries when all interested per-
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sons lmew that Mr. Coca had died is not explained by 
appellant. And, in. fact, the Release itself makes this 
reference: the "accident involved Wilford Joseph Coca, 
who died from injuries sustained." (Exhibit 1). 
That this argwnent · is completely frivolous and 
palpably without merit is demon-strated by the fact that 
at no time has appellant ever contended that she mis-
understood the import or effect of the document she 
signe·d. 
Ap·pellant's second contention rests upon the 
patently erroneous assumption that the Release calls 
for payment in cash. Appellant might argue with equal 
validity that it calls for payment in red gold. 
Appellant concedes· that a promise will support a 
Rele·ase (Brief, p. 5) 'but contends that here she was 
entitled to cash. Even if she were, how can she complain 
when the check was never p-resented for payment1 Par-
ticularly when defendants have at all times stood ready 
to p·ay the amount agreed upon in the release. 
In Dovich v. Chief Consolidated Mining Co·mpafii!J, 
53 Utah 522, 17 4 P. 627,. ( 1918), this instruction was 
approved by this Court: 
"The defendant contends that if the plaintiff 
ever had a clailn against the defendant, that the 
same was fully settled between the parties by the 
agreement and release introduced in evidence and 
marked Exhibit 3. ·You are instructed that the 
giving or receiving of tlie one dollar mentioned 
was not essential to make the same a binding 
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agreement, but that the agreement on the part of 
the defendant co1npany to pay the plaintiff half 
his wages for a period of 26 weeks was sufficient 
consideration to Inake the same binding upon the 
plaintiff. * * * " 
~~The release recited receipt of one dollar. There was evi-
dence that plaintiff rejected the tender of one dollar.) 
The Dovieh Case fully recognizes that any considera-
tion sufficient to support a simple contract will support 
a release. The CB)Se of Shaw v. Victo,ria Coach LVnes, 314 
Mass·. 262, 50 N.E. (2d) 27, cited by appellant is in no 
way inconsistent with this principle, since, in the Shaw 
Case, both the release and the draft were held to be 
releases. 
To argue that there was no consideration for thi'S 
release is to grasp at straws, to ignore th·e substance of 
the transaction, and to disregard the conduct of .hmnan 
beings in their ordinary affairs. 
It is asserted that the release should be set up as an 
affirmative defense and should not be made the basis 
of a motion for sununary judginent-that there is no 
authority for such procedure. 
Ifowever, Rule 56 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, provides: 
"A party against whom a clai1n ... is asserted 
... may, at any tim,e, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a suntmary judgment in his 
favor ... " (Emphasis added). 
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And in Suckow Borax Mim.es Consolidate.d v. Borax Co~ 
solidated, (9 Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 196, defendant did 
move for sunnnary judgment prior to answer with affi-
davits setting up a general release. The· Court said: 
"Clearly Rule 56 permits affirmative defenses 
to be raised in a motion for summary judgment. 
(Citing Cases) And the amendment to Rule 12 
('b) ... requires a motion to dismiss (for failure 
to state a claim) to be treated as a motion for 
summary judgment if 1natters outside the plead-
ings. are presented to, and are not excluded by, the 
court. * * * We accordingly hold that the affirma-
tive defenses of release and statute of limitations 
were properly raised and presente-d by the pro-
cedure employed by appelle~s." (p. 205). 
In her brief, appellent complains that a copy of the 
release was not attache.d to the affidavit. 
It should be sufficient to point out that appellant 
received ·a copy of the relea!Se prior to the hearing on 
the motion (R. 17); the substance of the release was set 
forth in the affidavit served with the motion (R. 2, 3); 
appellant made no objection to the offer of the release 
as an exhibit for p~urposes of the motion (R. 9') and made 
no objection to any procedural matters until the motion 
had been fully argued by both sides (R. 17.) 
Under Rule 56, supra, the court may con'Sider 
"admissions" of the parties. Appellant admitted in her 
reply that she executed the#'elease. How app·ellant could 
have been prejudiced in any way is not even suggested. 
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7 
'l'his argument is simply another diversion, far distant 
from the issue in the case, designed to obscure rather 
than illwninate. 
The remainder of appellant's brief is devoted to the 
argument that the material set forth in her reply was 
sufficient to raise a genuine issue as to a material fact. 
In this connection it might be of assistance· to the court 
to set forth· a brief sun1mary of the law ·as it relates to 
the sufficiency of affidavits on rnotion for sunrmary judg-
ment. 
Affidavits must be "made on personal knowledge" 
and must "set forth srich facts as would be admissible 
in evidence" and rnust ''show affirmatively that the. 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters 'Stated 
therein." Rule 56 (e) supra. 
"Affidavits filed by a party in support of or 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgrnent 
must present evidence. The affidavits should 
follow 'substantially the 'Same form as though the 
affiant were giving testimony in court.'" Steward 
e't al., v. Nissen et al., (D.C., D. Dela., 1942) 2 
F.R.D. 545, quoting, Shientag, Sum1nary J udg-
ment, 4 F'ordharn La.w Review 186,198. 
Paragraph one of appellant's reply (R .. 5). states 
simply that the release is· invalid. This is a stark conclu-
·sion which cannot be considered in determining whether 
or not there is a genuine issue of fact.· 
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Paragraph 2 of appellant's reply states that the 
release is without conside.ration. This statement is like-
wise an inadmissible conclusion. She states also that the 
check was returned without having been presented for 
payment. This is admitted by all parties. No issue of 
fact is thereby generated. 
Paragraph 3 of appellant's reply states that the 
release is invalid because of great emotional distress and 
mental and nervous shock and extreme mental pain suf-
fered by plain tiff. This, also, is a conclusion, and, 
even if this condition were shown by competent factual 
evidence, it would not constitute a defense. 
"In ordinary contracts the test is, were the 
mental faculties so deficient or impaired ·that 
there was not sufficient power to comprehend the 
subject of the contract, its nature and its proba-
ble consequences, and to act with discretion .in 
relation thereto, or with relation to the ordinary 
affairs of life~" Hatch v. Hatch, et al., 46 Utah 
218, 148 P. 433 (1914), Citing Tee Garden v. 
Lewis, administrator, 145 Ind. 98, 44 N.E. 9. See, 
also O'Reilly v. McClean, et al., 84 Utah 551, 37 
P. (2d) 770 (1934); Burgess, et al v. Colby, et al, 
93 Utah 103, 71 P. (2d) 185 (1937); and Jimenez 
v. O'Brien, et al, (Utah 1949) 213.P. (2d) 337. 
A p-e-rson may be in great emotional distress and 
mental and nervous shock and extreme mental pain and 
still "comprehend the subject of the contract, its nature 
and probable consequences." 
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It is most significant that appellant never has and 
does not now contend or even suggest that she did not 
know the nature and effect of the agreement. 
In Jim.enez v. O'Brien, et al., (Utah 1949) 213 P. 
(2d) 337, Plaintiff sued defendant for damages resulting 
from an automobile accident occurring on July 6, 1945. 
Jimenez was taken to the St. Marks Hospital where his 
injuries were diagnosed as severe brain. contusion. He 
was unconscious for two and one-half weeks. His condi-
tion, however, gradually improved after the eighth day 
in the hosiptal. An insurance adjuster for the insurer 
of the automobile which collided with that in which plain-
tiff was riding as a passenger, called on J'imenez on July 
13, but Jimenez's condition rendered him incapa:ble of 
carrying on a conversation. The adjuster returned to the 
hospital in about a week at which time he was able to 
talk with Jimenez, but Jimenez was unable to recall the 
facts of the accident. Repeated visits were made to see 
Jimenez, six or seven times in all. On August 13, 1945, 
the adjuster took with him a shorthand reporter to the 
hospital where she took down a series of questions asked 
by the adjuster and answered by Jimenez. Jimenez testi-
fied at the trial that he had no recollection of this con-
versation. The adjuster testified that he returned to the 
hospital the evening of that same day and discussed set-
tlement with J'imenez. The next morning someone phoned 
the adjuster from the hospital and requested that he· come 
there. When he arrived, he found Jimenez fully dressed, 
sitting on the bed talking with a woman friend. Jimenez 
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was given three drafts covering his hospital bills and 
general damages of $1,000.00, and Jimenez signed a 
general release. The drafts were endorsed and· aashed 
with1n a short time. On each draft above the. endorsement 
there was stated that the endorsement constituted a 
release of all claims. 
On Septe1nber 5, Jimenez called up the adjuster's 
office and requested payment of a bill at the General 
Hospital of $26.35. A draft was thereupon issued for 
that amount. After Jimenez had left with the draft, the 
adjuster realized that he had neglected to have Jimenez 
. sign a release for this draft; he caught up with him be-
fore he had left the office building. J'imenez returend 
to the office and signed a similar release. 
Several months later Jimenez consulted an attorney, 
and action was commenced. Defendant pleaded the re-
lease,. and plaintiff replied, alleging that he was not 
mentally competent to contract at the time he signed the 
release. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. 
The Supreme Court held that the jury could not have 
reasonably found ·by clear, unequivocal, and· convincing 
evidence that Jimenez was mentally incompetent to con-
tract on both August 14, 1945, and on September 5, 1945, 
saying that clear unequivocal, and convincing evidence 
is a higher degree of p·roof than a mere preponderance 
of the evidence and app·roa~hes tha.t degree of proof be-
yond reasonable doubt. The Court relied upon the test 
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laid down in Hatch v. Hatch, sup.ra, and found that 
Jimenez could 1neet the test of contractural capacity as 
a matter of law. The judg1nent was reversed. 
There is no fact contained in Paragraph 3 of the 
reply which would, if true, be sufficient to, avoid the 
release; nor was any such fact represented to the Court 
by appellant's attorneys at the time of the argument, even 
though Judge Van Cott specifically requested on several 
occasions for appellant to state what her evidence would 
show. Every opportunity was afforded appellant to rep-
resent to the court any fact which would relieve appellant 
from the release. No such representa~ion was made. 
Nothing was said which would even vaguely imply that 
appellant did not know that she was releasing all claims. 
No suggestion to that effect is made in this court. 
In paragraph 4 o.f appellant's reply it is stated that 
the release is invalid because of fraud and misrepresen ta-
tion-a further conclusion not admissible in evidence. 
It is stated that defendants represented that the damage 
to the cars was slight and that the taxi driver was a good 
driver, and was without fault, and not negligent. No 
statement is made to the effect that the driver was not 
a good driver and was with fault or was negligent. How-
ever, even if such were the case, it is well established 
that a misrepresentation of law does not vitiate a release 
unless it is made recklessly or without belief of its 
truth, none of which appears from appellant's reply or 
from stateinents rnade during the argument upon this 
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motion. Nor does it appear fro1n appellant's reply that 
the damage to the Coca car caused ·by the cab was not 
s~ght or that app·ellant signed the release under a mis-
apprehension of that fact or that such a representation 
was made for the purpose of deceiving appellant or that 
app·ellant did not have the ab'ility or understanding to 
ascertain that fact for herself, nor would it appear that 
such a fact would be material in any event. 
In Kelley v. Salt Lake· Trarnsportation. Co.,. et al., 
(Utah 1941) 116 P. (2d) 383, quoted in part only by 
app·ellants, plaintiff was a passenger in one of defend-
ant's cabs on February 10,.1940, when the driver applied 
his brakes without warning, in ·order to avoid a collision, 
so suddenly that plaintiff was thrown from the rear seat 
against the hack of the front seat and into the bottom of 
the cab. Defendant denied negligence, but to discharge 
any possible claims on February 21, 1940, paid to plain-
tiff $20.00, which plaintiff acknowledged receipt of in 
writing and in consideration thereof, released defend-
ants from all claims. In her reply plaintiff admitted sign-
ing the release, but alleged that her signature was pro-
cured ·by misrep-resentation and fraud, consisting of 
statements made by defendants' agents that defendants 
were not l'iable to her in dam.ages. Later plaintiff re-
turned the $20.00 to defendants, stating that she would 
not further be bound by the p·rovisions of the release. 
The evidence showed that on February 13', plaintiff called 
Mr. Charlef;; A. Boynton of defendant company, and he 
sent. her to see Dr. Spencer Wright. On the 14th Mr. 
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Boynton had Dr. Wright call at plaintiff's home. On the 
15th or 16th plaintiff saw Dr. Byron Reese and on the 
18th, Dr. Howard T. Anderson, both doctors of her 
choice .. In response to a telephone call fron1 plaintiff, 
Mr. Boynton saw her on the 14th or ~5th and offered 
her $10.00 and payment of all doctor bills in settlement, 
which she refused. In response to a telephone call by Mr. 
George Utley, plaintiff's brother, Mr. Boynton returned 
to plaintiff's home on the 21st. Mr. Utley had stated 
that they were ready to talk settlement. Mr. Boynton 
offered payment of $20.00 and payment of all past doctor 
bills and further treatments by Dr. Wright. Mr. Utley 
suggested plaintiff accept. Plaintiff signed the release 
and received $20.00 in currency. 
The Court said: 
"A release may be avoided if the. releasor is 
at the time of its execution mentally incompetent, 
and this incompetence may be caused by various 
things, such as disease or physical injury, nervous 
shock, extreme mental pain, etc., or if the release 
is obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. ·But 
to so make a release void, it must be clearly shown 
that the releasor did not possess at the time of 
the execution of the release sufficient understand-
ing to know the nature and effect of the agree-
ment, or to be able to carefully consider his or 
her rights, or that he or she signed the release 
·under a misapprehension of the facts, which was 
induced by the false and fraudulent representa-
tions of the party released, made for the purpose 
of deceiving the releasor and actually deceiving 
him or her as to the facts. It is the duty of a 
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releasor, having the ability and understanding to 
familiarize himself or herself with the contents 
of the written release and to exercise prudence in 
signing it. 
"The evidence of fraud rnust be clear, precise, 
and indubitable; otherwise it should be·withdrawn 
from the jury. 
"In the absence of a confidential relationship 
... a misrepresentation of law does not vitiate a 
release unless it is 1nade recklessly or without 
belief of its truth. 
"The inadequacy of the consideration for the 
release may be so gross as to clearly indicate 
fraud, hut ·here the consideration was not grossly 
inadequate, and is not indicative of any fraud or 
overreaching on the part of the appellant com-
panies' agent." 
It was held that the Trial Court erred in failing to direct 
a verdict in favor of the defendant. 
Paragraph 5 states that defendants possessed 
superior knowledge of the facts and of the law and took 
advantage of app·ellant's ignorance. This statement is so 
obviously a conclusion that it could not be admissible in 
evidence and is so vague as to present no fact at all for 
the consideration and assistance of the court. 
Appellant contends that the consideration for the 
release was inadequate and was a badge of fraud. This, 
of course, assumes defendants were liable and that plain-
tiff has suffered p·ecuniary damage, none of which is 
supported by any evidence set forth in the reply or 
otherwise. 
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In Dovich v. Chief Consolida.ted Mining Compam;y, 
53 Utah 522, 174 P. 627 (1918), this Court ap·pToved the 
following language contained in an instruction: 
"If you find from the evidence that the plain-
tiff signed the release understanding that he was 
giving up his cause of action against the defend-
ant, your verdict must be in favor of the defend-
ant, and it is not material that you may believe 
that the consideration agreed upon. was not ade-
quate considering the extent of the injury as it 
now appears. :J • • " 
See also, .A.nders;on v. Oregon Shortline Railroad Com-
pany, 47 Utah 614, 155 P. 446 (1916) where $25.00 was 
paid for injury resulting in amputation of a finger, and 
Kelley v. Salt Lake Tra;n.sportation Co., et al, supra. 
Under the Kelley and Jimenez cases a release can 
be avoided only by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence"-evidence approaching that degree of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. Such evidence the ·appellant 
failed to show. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Rule 56 of the F·ederal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
adopted for definite and specific reasons. As the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently 
observed: 
"The purpose of the rule is to provide against 
the vexation and delay which comes from the 
formal trial of cases in which there is not su'b-
stantial issue of fact, and permit the expeditious 
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disposition of cases of that kind." Broderick Wood 
Products Co. v. United States, (10 Cir. 1952) 195 
F. (2d) 433. 
App·ellant suggests that judg1nent was entered 
against her in this case because o.f her failure to strictly 
comply with the rules relating to the form of affidavits. 
App:ellant forgets that she was given the opportunity of 
going beyond the matters contained in her Reply. She 
forgets that the court made repeated inquiry for any 
information tending to indicate that a genuine issue of 
fact might be in existence. Ap.pellant had no such facts 
then and has none now. Appellant was ·satisfied with the 
settlement when made but later simply changed her mind. 
Releases and settlements perform ~ salutory fune-
tion in the adjustment of claims and in the compromise 
of difference.s. It is indeed fortunate that the law does 
not permit a person to repudiate a settlement agreement 
upon the. me&gre showing made by appellant in this case. 
If such were the law, "settlements,. instead of becoming 
the means of avoiding strife and unnecessary litigation, 
would become a most prolific source of both." And.erson 
v. Oregon Shortline Rail'road Comp·awy, 47 Utah 614, 618, 
155 P. 446 (1916). 
The judg1nent of the lower court rests firmly upon 
sound and established legal principles-both substantive 
and procedural. It should be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully sub1nitted·, 
SK~EN, THURMAN, 
WORS-LEY & SNOW, 
Attorneys fQr Responi/;ent. 
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J~ 
RELEASE OF ALL ClAIMS 
~ gm IN COJ!SIDERJ-TIO~f the pa~~/us at this time of the sum oL----------;;;;;---.~-~-.'--J.······-· .. "L.a.r;. ........................... .Dollars_ ($.3.-a.o~---->, 
:::::.::~~~:J~:&y~L.::~ __ :: 
of and from any and all action, causes o acti n, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, ex-
penses and compensation, on account of, or in any way growing out of, any and all known and unknown 
that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite, and in making this release and agreement it is 
understood and agreed that ljwe rely wholly upon my jour own judgment, belief and knowledge of the 
nature, extent and duration of said injuries, and that ljwe have not been influenced to any extent what-
ever in making this release by any representations or statements regarding said injuries, or regarding 
any other matters, made by the persons, firms or corporations who are hereby released, or by any per-
son or persons representing him or them, or by any physician or surgeon by him or them employed. 
It is further understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and ~h-
t the ~~ ;o~ to ~~~as an admission of ~a~i~ty. on the part of.~ 
.........,~--~~ ... -~ ..... ,by whom liability 1s expressly demed. 
c tains the ENTIRE AGREEMENT between the parties hereto, and the terms of this 
release are contractual and not a mere recital. 
ljwe further state that I;we have carefully read the foregoing release and know the contents 
thereof, and ljwe sign the same as my jour own free act. 
Wltn~-----hand,and sealoothi•---~--10?-.='Y of-----4-2--------------------· 19 . .6::.3 
In presence of CAUTION! READ BEFORE SIGNING 
~--~~~---------------(Seal) 
"'-~~i.-.(Seal) 
C _ /& ./:£:.~~~~~-.;) _______________ (Seal) 
/J /1 ~./flf' - c -,_ ~ -lu;;~~?;--c;;;_ ~-~~-- ;y~----------(Seal) 
~~.~~ 
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